Craig Symonds
Subject: The 80th Anniversary of the Nazi Germany Surrender
Bio: Professor of History at the US Naval Academy
Reading: Neptune: The Allied Invasion of Europe and the D-Day Landings is here
Darren Schwartz
Subject: Saving Private Ryan
Bio: What Happens Next Culture Critic
Transcript:
Larry Bernstein:
Welcome to What Happens Next. My name is Larry Bernstein. What Happens Next is a podcast which covers economics, politics, and culture.
Today’s topic is the 80th anniversary of the Nazi Germany Surrender.
The Germans surrendered on May 7, 1945, which is 80 years ago. I am planning a series of podcasts about the end of WW2. Our speaker today is Craig Symonds who is the author of the book, Neptune: The Allied Invasion of Europe and the D-Day Landings. Craig is a Professor of History at the US Naval Academy. I want to learn from Craig about how US and British military planners conceived of the D-Day invasion, what equipment was required for this amphibious attack, and what the challenges were there against such a formidable foe. This podcast is a first of a two-part series with Craig on the war against the Germans.
Our second speaker today will be with our What Happens Next Culture Critic Darren Schwartz. We are going to review Steven Spielberg’s classic movie Saving Private Ryan about our invasion of Europe on June 6, 1944.
Craig can you please begin with six minutes of opening remarks.
Craig Symonds:
There's a tendency to conceive of the allied invasion of Nazi occupied Europe as taking place on the 6th of June 1944. That's not wrong, but it overlooks that the planning, the arguing, the strategic back and forth, the creation of the material, getting the troops to England, the training the troops in England, carrying out practice landings for more than 14 months is what made June 6th, 1944 possible.
The Americans have a tendency to think once a decision is made, let's do it. If we're going to invade Europe, let's go now. And the British who not only had been in this war for a couple of years before we got into it but had also years in the trenches of World War I, were loath to say, “let's go right now.” They knew the wherewithal needed to get that done. As soon as it looks like either Germany or the Russians are about to collapse, those would be triggers for us to go. Otherwise, let's wait. And in the end, I think what emerged was a compromise. The Americans wanted to go in 1943. The British were dragging their feet, but June 6th, 1944, turned out to be the culmination of all that argumentation and industrial preparation, particularly in shipping, which simply did not exist in 1943.
Larry Bernstein:
After Pearl Harbor, the British want to choose a different location to begin warmaking. They want to invade North Africa, and this is opposed by the Senior Army leadership of the United States who feel that the Mediterranean is more a function of preserving the British Empire: Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Suez and their Indian empire. And the Americans aren't interested. Marshall specifically wants to take the war to Germany and does not want any indirect battles.
What do you make of the British demand to begin the war in North Africa, and how do you explain the American error in focusing on Germany first versus trying to cause trouble elsewhere?
Craig Symonds:
The problem the English-speaking allies have in 1942 is twofold. One is that they are extremely sensitive to the fact that the Russians are carrying the brunt of that war. Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in June of 1941, so by mid-1942, they've been at it for a year. They have lost millions of men on the Eastern front, thousands of planes, and tanks. The Germans have driven deep into Soviet territory, and the Russians are carrying this burden alone. They are especially suspicious that the Americans and the British are letting this happen to weaken the Soviet Union and to Germany so that they can pick up the cards when the game is over. It's not entirely incorrect for Stalin to see it this way.
He wants to know, when are you guys going to get into this war? In summer of 1942, the Germans are going to make a final push to take over our country, and when are you going to get off your butts and relieve us from carrying the burden of this war?
Molotov comes to Washington, and Roosevelt says to Molotov, we are going to do something against Germany and we are going to do it this year 1942. After he leaves, George Marshall, the American Chief of Staff, says, “Mr. President, we can't fulfill that promise.” It's Churchill who says, “we can't invade France. That is just beyond us, but we could invade North Africa.”
The difficulty is in French North Africa there are no Germans. So, the question is, how is that going to take pressure off the Russians? The problem is it is the only thing the Allies had the capability of doing in 1942 that is within the European theater. Eventually it will draw some German troops into North Africa.
A major campaign in North Africa may provide some help to the Soviets, but not the kind of help that Stalin was looking for and that Molotov believes was promised to him in the White House
Larry Bernstein:
30 years ago, I traded emerging markets bonds, and I went to visit Russia because we took positions in Russian securities. I decided to go visit the World War II Museum in Moscow. And what struck me was that the United States and the UK were not discussed in the museum. That this was a war between Germany and Russia, and that they had had won that war.
On the way from the airport into Moscow, a remnant of a burning tank remains on the highway to remind the city folk how close the Germans were to Moscow. Tell us about how the Russians view World War II and the differences how they think about this war than we do.
Craig Symonds:
The Russian view of the Second World War remains largely that the war was fought on the Eastern Front where millions of men confronted each other along a 1200-mile front, while the British and Americans fought German U-boats and bombed Berlin and did various things on the periphery but did nothing seriously to undertake a major campaign against large units of the German army.
In terms of the number of divisions, the Germans had upward of 200 divisions allied against the Russians in 1942 and 1943. And the United States only mobilized 90 divisions in the entire war, including both the Europe and the Pacific. Their view today is still that Russia essentially won this war with the Americans and the British coming in near the very end in 1944 and helping pick up the pieces. But the Russian people are the ones who won the Second World War.
Larry Bernstein:
I want to turn to Operation Torch next. This isn't something that gets a lot of time in a standard US history class. We go straight to D-Day. Can you give us some background as it relates to the choice of the invasion of Morocco, the means of attack that were used, why it was a good preparation for D-Day, and why the allies were victorious.
Craig Symonds:
The compromise decision made by the British and the Americans to invade French North Africa is perplexing because there were no Germans in French North Africa in 1942. There was uncertainty about how the French would react. The French had been defeated in 1940 by the German Wehrmacht. A small portion of the country with its capital in the spa town of Vichy, known as Vichy France, ostensibly controlled French North Africa as well as the colonies overseas. And their loyalty was uncertain. Would they welcome the Anglo-Americans as liberators? Would they defend their soil from invaders?
Operation Torch took place in November of 1942 and the French did fight to defend their soil. As one British observer noted, they fought with a bravery worthy of a better cause, but soon enough, an understanding was reached that the French would accommodate the Anglo-American invasion in exchange for the inclusion of the Free French in the Allied Coalition against Nazi Germany. It did succeed in capturing North Africa, but it delayed the invasion of Nazi occupied France.
Larry Bernstein:
Let's talk about Operation Torch in the context of the Allied strategic plan. The way I looked at it was how can we knock Italy out of the war? By landing in North Africa, we test the amphibious approaches that you will later use at D-Day.
Then they push up against Rommel’s forces in Tunisia. There's that famous scene in Patton where Patton is screaming out to Rommel, “I've read your book, I know what you're up to.” And then when the North Africans, when Rommel’s forces are not supported, it allows the British and American forces to then invade Italy.
It is important to appreciate the strategic plan and the opportunities that it creates for the allies to go through North Africa. They did not give a damn about Morocco. They cared about the Mediterranean.
Craig Symonds:
Franklin Roosevelt as a political animal, recognized the absolute necessity of getting American troops into combat somewhere in the European theater in 1942, not only to satisfy Stalin, but to satisfy the impatience of the American people. The problem for the Anglo-American invasion that the British did not think the Americans were up to scratch.
The Americans landed in Morocco on the Atlantic edge of North Africa. The British went through the Straits of Gibraltar and landed in Algeria and Tunisia. So, they were in a position to move swiftly across the periphery of North Africa and claim it for the Allied cause. But it did not move swiftly as the British feared. The Americans were not that sharp against the Germans, particularly after Rommel brought what came to be known as the Afrika Korps over from Europe to fight in Libya and Tunisia.
And the battle at Kasserine Pass in February of 1943 exposed the Americans as being not quite the varsity team. The British had always suspected this, but Kasserine Pass revealed. Over time, the Americans got better, and they did drive the Germans back to Tunisia and eventually succeed in North Africa, but it took six months. It was a slog. And that delayed the sending of material, manpower, machines, equipment to England for the eventual D-Day operation. Just as George Marshall feared the venture into the Mediterranean delayed D-Day.
For the British, the Mediterranean was especially important because not only was it a way of getting into the European war without having to commit to a major invasion of the continent, it was also a way of protecting the Empire because the series of stepping stones from Gibraltar to Malta to Suez, that line of communication was the lifeline to India, which was the jewel of the British Empire.
For Churchill, the maintenance of the British Empire was a major objective. The Americans are suspicious about that too. The Anglo-American partners were partners to be sure but partners with different objectives.
Larry Bernstein:
Years ago, I read Eisenhower's book Crusade for Europe. One of the things I thought was interesting about his discussion about Operation Torch was that they were going to use Casablanca as a landing place with the hope of moving the troops very quickly to fight in places like Tunisia. And when they landed, they had special boats made that delivered locomotives in the port in Casablanca, and then troops would jump on. Tell us about logistics. The railroad isn't new to war. In the Civil War, the Americans used the rails to concentrate troops. Tell us about landing in North Africa and using technology to push troops to fight the enemy.
Craig Symonds:
One of the things the allies learned during Operation Torch, the invasion of North Africa was the difficulty of logistics of getting an armored force ashore against a defended beach. Now, most people listening to our broadcast probably are aware of the small landing craft, the Higgins boats built by Andrew Jackson Higgins in Louisiana with a drop front bow and the troops charging out onto the beach. But the important thing in modern warfare in the middle 20th century is getting the armor ashore.
Well, how do you do that? Eventually what would emerge is a critical vessel called the Landing Ship Tank, the LST, but these did not exist in 1942. They were still in the process of being imagined and constructed. So how do you get large, armored weapons ashore in numbers? You need a harbor for that. You cannot do it across a beach in 1942.
One of the ways to do this was to bring in large sea cargo ships with rail cars onboard, offload them onto a working dock, which is why the allies’ needed places like Casablanca and then use those rail cars to transport the heavy equipment eastward into Tunisia to turn this into a quick coup de main to seize North Africa.
Most of that plan came unglued immediately. First, the weather was bad. There was only one railroad track that led from the Atlantic coast all the way to Tunisia and getting everything along that one track, crowding them all together like a funnel proved to be insurmountable. And then once Rommel’s Afrika Korps arrives and begins to push back, that is when this campaign turns into a slow slog instead of a quick dash.
Larry Bernstein:
France had been split in two. The Germans successfully ended the war with France in June 1940 and separated the country into two parts. German occupied France in the north and the Vichy government in the south. Vichy was responsible for these colonies in North Africa.
As a personal matter, my grandfather had fought in the French Foreign Legion and was in the South of France with my grandmother and my mother. They hid for years in Marseille. Immediately after Operation Torch began, Churchill made a speech to the House of Commons, in which he said that this was not the beginning of the end of the war, but it may be an end of the beginning.
At that time when Hitler found that the Vichy did not put up a fight against the Allies, he realized that to protect the southern coast, he would have to put German troops in the south of France. And my grandfather saw the German troops goosestep into Marseille, and he turned to my grandmother and said, our time is up. We must head for the Pyrenees to escape, which he did. And what he said in his memoirs was, “Churchill may believe it's just the end of the beginning, but for our family, it is the beginning of the end.”
Tell us about Germany's decision to occupy all of France and the strategic implications of that.
Craig Symonds:
Hitler decided that the French could not be counted on to defend their own territory, which was clearly true. And so he simply erased the border he had approved between Vichy France, supposedly independent France, and German occupied France, so that the Germans occupied all of France. He did this in part to make sure that there was no collaboration between Vichy forces, that the French Navy, what remained of it in Marseille and other Southern French ports did not defect to the allies.
Larry Bernstein:
You mentioned that when amateurs evaluate war, they focus on strategy and professionals focus on logistics. Let's talk about logistics.
How do we build that war material? How do we get it over? How do we train troops? How do we embark on this landing? Take us through the logistical planning and execution of the most daring aspect of World War II.
Craig Symonds:
I'm going to make a challenging statement here, but I think what won the Second World War for the Allies was American industrial productivity. Yes, strategy is important. The bravery of the troops on the beaches and the Battle of the Bulge all critical. But without the industrial productivity of the United States, none of that would have been possible.
In 1942 gearing up American industry to produce the tools of war. The bottleneck is tanks and airplanes. Shipping is the key. You have got to get that stuff across the Atlantic through the German U-boats. You've got to get it to England, then you have to get it across the channel onto the Normandy beaches and sustain it there indefinitely.
The allies simply did not have the shipping available to do any of that. The United States has also embarked on a major campaign in the Central Pacific that requires virtually unlimited amounts of shipping: cargo ships, transport ships, oilers, tankers, landing ships, as well as warships: aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, and particularly destroyers.
The dilemma for American productivity, as impressive as it was, is prioritizing what's the first thing you need to build. We need to have cargo ships to get material across the Atlantic or Britain will starve. You also need escort ships to guard those convoys, or the convoys will never get to Britain. And then you need amphibious ships in the Pacific to sustain troops there, and then begin the Central Pacific drive.
This prioritization of shipping generally, but the kinds of ships you need to build was a constant thrashing back and forth. There is this effort to make sure not only that the materials are built, but that they are built in the order in which the allies need the most.
Larry Bernstein:
You mentioned that Roosevelt was concerned about domestic politics and his decision to pursue Operation Torch. I did a podcast a few weeks ago with HW Brands about his book on Lindbergh and Roosevelt. Roosevelt was disingenuous. He would say, I'm going to keep you out of the war in his public remarks. But in his private correspondence and activities, he was doing everything he could to put America in position to go to war, specifically against Germany. Tell us about how Roosevelt decided to pursue war with Germany.
Craig Symonds:
Franklin Roosevelt was convinced that American national security depended heavily on whether Britain survived. A Europe completely dominated by Nazi Germany would not be in America’s national interest. He was willing to go a long way to support Britain in its war. Lend-lease is the classic example, this somewhat disingenuous analogy between when your neighbor's house is on fire, you don't charge him $15 for your hose, you lend him the hose, he gives it back when he's done, as if somehow Britain would give back the tanks, planes, and ships that we gave to them under Lend-lease once the war was over. But he succeeded in convincing the American Congress that to support Britain and its war against Germany was in America’s national interest.
His political foes said he was lying here, that he planned to get into this war all along, that he was going to be a British ally, that he was going to send American boys to die in Europe just as they had in 1917. I don't think those charges are true. I think what Roosevelt saw as the perfect outcome is that American money could produce the tools of war. Russian blood would supply the manpower necessary to grind down the Nazi war machine, and that British grit would allow them to carry on long enough so that Germany could be defeated with American money without the United States having to go into the war.
Now, if it turned out that the United States had to go to war, he certainly wanted the United States to be prepared. And throughout 1940 and 1941, he repeatedly went back to the Congress and asked for more money for airplanes, for ships, for war materials to improve the defensive capabilities of the United States.
Larry Bernstein:
Winston Churchill mentioned to FDR that he had three major concepts related to winning the World War II against the Germans: blockade, bombing and subversion.
Craig Symonds:
Britain's great strength strategically has always been its navy; Britain rules the waves. Blockade was one way to cordon off Germany. But Germany had conquered so much of the European continent. Blockade was always going to be an element of British warfare against any continental foe. It had been for centuries and would continue to be so in World War II. Bombing from the air was a new technology. The idea was that this would depress support for Hitler when German cities burned that would undermine Hitler's ability to control his own population.
Churchill backed away from that in seeing the reaction of the British people to the Blitz. Churchill counted on internal unrest that there would be resistance movements in France that would undermine the Nazi war machine. So, over a period of years, the Nazi regime would become weakened so that when the invasion took place these elements had so weakened the Nazi empire, that a landing would be like kicking down a house of cards and the whole thing would collapse in its own rotten mess.
Larry Bernstein:
As I mentioned before, when the Germans invaded Vichy France in November 1942, my grandfather decided to go with my grandmother and mother towards the French border with Spain. Members of the French resistance assisted my family getting out across the Pyrenees Mountains in December 1942. When he met that motley crew of the French resistance, it was a small group of men. They had been smugglers. They did not look like any army of any significance. Later after D-Day, there was this sense of scale and heroics that everyone had been a member of the French Resistance. Marcel Orpheus’ film The Sorrow and the Pity they pooh poohed the extent of the French Resistance.
I sympathize with the French. What do you want from normal people? They just want to go on with their lives. They're not going to put themselves at risk. Only later when the Americans, British and Canadians are racing toward Paris, well now it's perfectly fine to come out to assert your chance at resistance. How should we think about the French resistance?
Craig Symonds:
Let's be candid here. There were far more collaborationists than resistors in occupied France from 1940 to 1944. That's human nature. People wanted to get on with their lives. Not everybody can put on a dark cloak at night and sneak out and do nefarious things to the German occupiers. And it is also true that once the war was over, those who had collaborated never wanted to confess that they had done so. And when I say collaboration, I don't mean active participation in support of the Germans. I simply mean if a German came into your shop, you would sell him goods and life would continue. But there were active collaborations as well. There were French women who married German soldiers. And after liberation in 1944, there was a comeuppance for those people.
They were dragged from their homes, their heads were shaved, they were shamed and shunned. Tens of thousands by one account were killed for collaborating with the Nazi occupiers. And the old joke is that if you talk to a Frenchman now, their grandparents were all in the resistance. The resistance movement has been romanticized in the decades since the war, that it was a relatively small group of extraordinarily brave men and women who took their lives in their hands to stand up for what they believed in. And many of them died in the process.
Larry Bernstein:
Before D-Day, Americans had to send their soldiers to England first, and this was a massive transportation logistics problem. And then when they did arrive, they had to find someplace to sleep. They had to be fed; they had to be trained.
Before the American Revolution, there were outbursts of violence in Boston. The British sent troops and they were quartered in American homes, and they did not like it. As part of our Bill of Rights in the Third Amendment, it says that Americans will not be required to quarter troops. And here in reverse the American troops arrive in England and must be quartered. Tell us about the quartering of the American troops and the logistical movements necessary to bring the Americans to Continental Europe.
Craig Symonds:
Beginning in late 1942, more than a million Americans arrived in Britain. And it was a culture shock for them and for the British who welcomed them. It is a measure of the British desperation in 1943 and 44 that they were willing to do so. The British made compromises with the Americans. The Americans wanted an area for battle practice with the live ammunition. And the British agreed to abandon their homes in the County of Devon, for example, along the channel coast. There's a very poignant moment when the Americans arrived at an old church and tacked to the wooden door of the church is a note that said, “this church has stood here for more than a thousand years. Our parents, grandparents, and great grandparents worked this land for as long as anyone now living can remember. We hope that you'll be gentle with our county and our towns and our homes, and we welcome you and thank you.”
The Americans found problems with the British. The beer was warm. The archetype is that the Americans walked among the villages handing out candy and gum to the children and that everybody was happy. But there were problems. There was not enough housing for a million new arrivals. Many of them were quartered in British homes. This was a violation not only of American sensibilities about quartering troops in private homes, but it was contrary to British practice as well. And yet the British accepted it.
An American group would be walking down the street, they would halt, the sergeant would get out a clipboard and say, “Smith and Jones, you're in that house. Go knock on the door.” And they did and were told to come in, and they got a room and ate with the families. In most cases became good friends and wrote to one another, assuming everyone survived afterward.
It's a measure of how desperate the British were for support in this war against Hitler's regime and how grateful they were for that the Americans were at last getting into it, that they would accommodate interferences such as that.
Larry Bernstein:
After Operation Torch, but before D-Day, the Brits decide to make a raid using Canadian forces at Dieppe and it is a disaster. Tell us about the catastrophe, and what they learned to apply for the much bigger battle.
Craig Symonds:
Winston Churchill wanted these little peripheral attacks on German occupied Europe prior to the invasion. He appointed Lord Mountbatten, who was well connected to the royal family, and a very convivial fellow. This was Mountbatten's baby from the start. He thought that we could demonstrate how such an operation, not a full-scale invasion, but maybe seize some of their radar stations that were along the coast so we could understand how their radar worked.
The Canadians who as one of Britain's partners in this war had sent large numbers of troops over to Britain, and they had been cooling their heels, going out on route patrols and marches, and digging latrines for months and were eager to get into the war. The Canadian government had the attitude, why should we send more troops to Britain? You're not using the troops we sent. So, these three factors all come together.
It went so badly that since then Dieppe has been a pseudonym for a failed operation. It was not well planned and certainly not well executed. It was doomed from the start. The amphibious vessels such as the LSTs that would play such a big role at D-Day were not available. Dieppe itself was in a bowl where the Germans had a good clear fire over the top of them, and the entire operation came unglued. Lare numbers of Canadians were killed.
Larry Bernstein:
There were many places to invade continental Europe. Ultimately, we chose Normandy. The Americans and the Brits made it known to the Germans that they were seriously considering Norway. Operation Anvil was an idea of invading Southern France. And then there were a couple of different choices by the English Channel. There was Calais and Normandy. Tell us about the strategic decision making about where to land, why they chose Normandy, and if you have any regrets on the ultimate American decision about where to place that landing.
Craig Symonds:
There is a psychological tendency to look back and say Normandy was the right decision because Normandy was eventually successful, but there were other options available. One of them was Norway. The allies tried to convince the Germans that Norway was going to be a major theater of operation, and they were so good at it that Hitler directed forces into Norway that might otherwise have been committed to the continent. Norway was a cul-de-sac. The problem is, even if you get into Norway, where do you go from there? If you go do South, you still have to get across the Skagerrak into Denmark, and then from Denmark, you have to fight your way south into Germany. It's a long way around and very difficult terrain, logistically unsustainable.
Norway not a good idea. Southern France maybe. After all, the allies had gone into North Africa and then into Sicily, and then into Italy. Why not just move up the coast, enter Southern France, fight up the Rhone River Valley to Paris? But once again, the logistics of that are difficult because Britain getting supplies and material from Britain into the Mediterranean involves a thousand miles sea voyage, and then supplying them involves multiple thousand miles sea voyages. It's the shot across the channel where it's 20 miles from one side to the other. Getting ashore that's the easy part. It's the supplying of the troops that get ashore, reinforcing them, bringing the food, the fuel, the tanks, the planes, the Jeeps, all the things needed to sustain and expand that foothold.
We do not win the battle in Normandy by landing on the 6th of June. Those landings take place for more than a month, well into July, repeatedly reinforcing and expanding the foothold. So doing that in the shortest possible turnaround is what works. Normandy has a broader coast. It has more available beaches. It is further from Germany, but it's less likely to be the target of a German counterattack than Callais. So once those factors were cranked in, Normandy came to be the obvious target of the allies.
The initial decision that Normandy was the place to land came not from Eisenhower and the Allied High Command, it came from Frederick Morgan who was a British Major General who was on the planning staff for the invasion of Europe. Once he put his finger on Normandy, everything evolved from that.
Larry Bernstein:
Thanks Craig. We are going to continue with the second part of our series on D-Day on our podcast next week. We are now going to bring in our What Happens Next Culture Critic Darren Schwartz to discuss the movie classic, Saving Private Ryan.
Darren Schwartz:
Saving Private Ryan is a gripping World War II epic directed by Spielberg that opens with the gruesome D-Day invasion of Normandy, which has been called one of the most intense battle scenes ever filmed. It follows a group of US soldiers led by Captain Miller, played by Tom Hanks, as they risk their lives behind enemy lines to find and bring home Private James Ryan, played by Matt Damon.
His three brothers have all been killed in action and the army says we can't have this mother receive a fourth letter. It's a gruesome emotional journey that explores sacrifice, duty, brotherhood, and war.
Larry Bernstein:
The podcast we just did with Craig Symonds, I asked Craig to set the stage for the invasion of D-Day, starting from Pearl Harbor, the preparation, and the war strategy. Spielberg doesn't do that at all. Spielberg starts with a Higgins Boat heading to the Normandy Beach, no background, no idea what's going on. What do you think of the decision by Spielberg to throw you into the water?
Darren Schwartz:
It was absolutely shocking. You're immediately thrown into the boat, and it is sensory overload. You got these Higgins boats with young soldiers. Guys are puking. You've got this first-person immersion as if you're a soldier. You're right there. They did a lot of handheld camera work.
At one point the sound goes blank. Remember, there was an explosion near Tom Hanks, it's from his first person where you can't hear anything until this hearing comes back.
I'm still haunted by that soldier who had his arm shot off, and you see him walking around looking, and then he picks up an arm and walks forward like he's going to get this thing sewn back on. It was by far the most startling 20 minutes of any film I've ever seen.
Larry Bernstein:
It gives you a sense of what it was like pinned down at the beach. The Higgins Boat front comes down and there's a machine gun firing in it killing one man after another. Then off the sides, and they have these hundred-pound packs. If you don't get that pack off, you drown and you see drowning people all over the place and you realize, this is not going as planned.
Darren Schwartz:
Those pillbox bunkers that have only a slit looking out at the beach. For the Germans, it's like they're shooting fish in a barrel.
There are so many things that stick out in my mind. Guy got hit in the helmet and he's amazed. There was a first bullet mark, he takes off his helmet and he is looking, oh my God, I got shot in the head twice and I'm okay. And then he gets shot in the head, he's dead. Don't take that thing off, man.
It was like a horror film. Guys yelling mama and their guts are hanging out. It was stark.
Larry Bernstein:
The film script is heavily influenced by Steven Ambrose's book on D-Day, which I read in preparation for this. And that book gives firsthand accounts, an oral history of D-Day from different people's perspectives. They were trying to capture the individual soldier's experience on that beach.
Darren Schwartz:
It was all fluid and things were changing.
The people put in charge to command troops were people that they thought could improvise. Tom Hanks and the troops were making their way up the beach towards the pillbox bunkers. He is trying to look around a corner to see where the shots are coming from, so he could direct his men. He has that little pocket mirror, and he takes his bayonet.
Larry Bernstein:
He takes the gum out of one of his colleague's mouth.
Darren Schwartz:
He says give me the gum so he can put it on the bayonet. And that's not in a field manual.
Larry Bernstein:
The movie handles moral questions. Is it worth risking more men to save another? The government has some obligation to the Ryan family not to lose four sons. But I wonder if it is fair because all lives are important. You are going to risk eight men to save that single soldier. Is it a public relations stunt?
Darren Schwartz:
It's not right, because I don't think it's a consistent program. This movie was based loosely on Fritz Niland. They went to get him because his two brothers had been killed and one brother was a POW. That brother ultimately got out and lived. There must have been hundreds of families that lost two sons. In Private Ryan it's a matter of you saw this secretary, she grabbed one letter she grabbed another, she looked back from a few weeks ago and she said, there are three Ryan children who are dead. She went to her supervisor, which was Brian Cranston.
Larry Bernstein
I didn't realize that. That's hilarious.
Darren Schwartz:
And there's definitely some cameos in here we can talk about. She took it to her supervisor who took it to his commander who got emotional.
Larry Bernstein:
That was George Marshall Chief of Staff of the Army.
Darren Schwartz:
Things happened because someone got emotional. You lose three sons, then you get to go home.
Larry Bernstein:
Fear starts in the first scene of the movie. They're on the boat and they see shells landing in the water near them on that Higgins boat. And people are throwing up, people are praying, people are calling out to their moms, absolute fear. Tom Hanks, playing Captain Miller, his left hand shakes uncontrollably at times. And in those moments, he grabs his canteen to hide that fear.
Darren Schwartz:
Grabbing the canteen was the wrong call. Put your hand in your pocket. Everyone can see the shaking. It was a dead giveaway to grab the canteen when your hands freak out.
Larry Bernstein:
The most important scene of fear is much later in a battle. There's a translator who finds himself in a situation where one of his close colleagues is in a hand-to-hand battle with a German. And they're rolling around and the German has a large knife on the chest of the individual. And if Upham gets the gumption to shoot the German, he will save his friend's life. But he's incapable of doing so. His friend is murdered in front of him. The German gets off his friend and looks at him in disbelief and then just walks away. That is an incredibly upsetting scene. Tell us about fear and why it's debilitating.
Darren Schwartz:
He can hear his buddy screaming and they're fighting. He's got a gun and he's got 12 steps to shoot the guy or just tackle him. And you're waiting for him to take a step and you're dying inside, do it. Come on man. And he can't do it. And it just shows what fear does to you. It's fight or flight or freeze. And he totally had frozen.
Larry Bernstein:
John Wayne would not have frozen on those steps.
Darren Schwartz:
I don't think I would've. I'm good under pressure. There's many, many examples of that.
Larry Bernstein:
One character who rises to the occasion is the sniper. He puts himself at risk and ultimately is killed in battle. That character was one of the highlights of the film.
Darren Schwartz:
He had ice in his veins. When they have made it past Omaha Beach and they're walking and lamenting this mission. We got to go save one guy and we're putting eight lives at risk. And everyone whining. And he, in a more eloquent way, says, “captain, I've got some thoughts on this. I think this is a misappropriation of my skills.” Tom Hanks even says, “listen up everyone, this is how you complain.” And he said, I've been given a God given talent to kill people. Why are you sending me on a mission to save one guy?
When he was shooting people, he was quoting from the Bible and then just gunning people down. I think he was straight up hero.
Larry Bernstein:
Next topic is killing prisoners who surrender.
America signed the Geneva Convention, and there is an ethical conduct in war that the army follows. When a soldier surrenders, you have a duty to take care of him. We know that the battlefield adrenaline is running high. Your buddy's been killed, you are angry that they just tried to kill you, kill that guy. Even in the first scene when they go to bomb a pillbox, out come a couple of with their hands up and one guy says, no, no, I'm Czech. I'm Czech. And they shoot him anyway. And then what did he say?
Darren Schwartz:
My hands are clean for dinner.
Larry Bernstein:
On the way to get Private Ryan they get a German soldier to surrender. Their medic Giovanni gets killed and they want to kill the soldier. Upham is complaining that we can't kill this guy. Ultimately, he befriends him, gives him a cigarette.
Hanks says to the German soldier, blindfold yourself, walk a thousand yards. Don't see where we go and we're going to set you free because we can't take you with us. That soldier ultimately did hook up with another platoon of Germans, and at the end of the movie that is who kills Hanks.
Ironically in that final scene of the film, Upham, who has been the one most concerned about shooting prisoners and preserving this German soldier's life. He surrenders to him again for second time.
Darren Schwartz:
With three other guys.
Larry Bernstein:
And he goes up him, it's me, it's me. And Upham realizes that the decision to allow him to live was hugely problematic. And he decides to violate his oath and kills the German soldier. So this is the man who recognized that this was both the law and the ethical thing to do. And then he decides, you know what? Screw that.
Darren Schwartz:
But he doesn't kill the other three. Isn't that interesting? He killed the one who killed his captain, but the other three he let go.
Larry Bernstein:
The Tom Hanks character is dying, and he turns to Private Ryan, and he says, a bunch of us here have died to save your life. You better make something of your life. If I am going to die, you got to earn it. Was that fair of Tom Hanks?
Darren Schwartz:
Earn this. It's not about be a hero and continue killing people. It is live your life in a way that's respectful of the sacrifice that he and five other soldiers had made. Is it fair? I think so. It is an insane mission to ask soldiers to do. I think it is fair.
Larry Bernstein
Did Saving Private Ryan win awards?
Darren Schwartz:
Saving Private Ryan won five Oscar awards: Director Cinematography, Film Editing, Sound, and Sound Effects Editing. It was nominated for six others that it did not win: Best Picture, Actor for Hank's, screenplay, direction, makeup and score.
Hank's lost to Jim Carrey in the Truman Show.
Edward Norton was offered the role of Private Ryan that Matt Damon got, turned it down for a movie called American History X.
Larry Bernstein:
Wow.
Darren Schwartz:
He was nominated the same year for best actor. He made the right call. That curb stomping scene, do you remember that?
Larry Bernstein:
That movie was crazy.
Darren Schwartz:
Saving Private Ryan won Best Picture for a Golden Globe and Best Director for Spielberg.
Larry Bernstein:
On May 7th, 1945, the German surrendered, and this is the 80th anniversary of the German Surrender in World War 2. Should our audience go out and watch Saving Private Ryan?
Darren Schwartz:
I really enjoyed seeing it, but the first 20 minutes are tough. Recognize you're going into a gruesome movie. To the men who gave their lives, certainly it is a nice way to honor them.
Larry Bernstein:
Steven Spielberg went to great lengths to make this movie feel realistic.
Darren Schwartz:
The cast was put through real military training, and it was a brutal bootcamp to build authenticity and comradery. Spielberg kept Matt Damon out. He wanted the actors that went through it to build resentment towards Matt Damon in real life. These guys are slaving away running laps and crawling through mud. And where's Matt Damon? Oh, he is in LA. He hasn't come here yet.
Larry Bernstein:
I cannot believe it. I have to risk my life for this guy.
Darren Schwartz:
They're like, screw this guy. That was fantastic.
Larry Bernstein:
What about Saving Private Ryan leaves its audience optimistic?
Darren Schwartz:
Hopefully we would not have to go to war and people don't have to die.
Larry Bernstein:
Thanks to Craig and Darren for joining us.
If you missed our previous podcast, the topic was Why Authoritarianism Beats Anarchy. Our speaker was Robert Kaplan who is the author of a new book entitled Waste Land. We heard why the world is in permanent instability and that we should expect ongoing conflict in economics, trade policy, migration, and on the battlefield.
You can find our previous episodes and transcripts on our website whathappensnextin6minutes.com. Please follow us on Apple Podcasts or Spotify. Thank you for joining us today, goodbye.
Check out our previous episode, Why Authoritarianism Beats Anarchy, here.
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